Dynamic Agenda Setting by Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hülya




By Ying Chen and Hülya Eraslan*
A party in power can address a limited number of issues. What issues 
to address—the party’s agenda—has dynamic implications because 
it affects what issues will be addressed in the future. We analyze a 
model in which the incumbent addresses one issue among many and 
the remaining issues roll over to the next period. We show that no 
strategic manipulation arises without checks and balances and iden-
tify strategic manipulations in the forms of waiting for the moment, 
seizing the moment, steering, and preemption with checks and bal-
ances depending on how power fluctuates. We also discuss efficiency 
implications. (JEL C78, D72, D78)
Legislation is not only about what policies to implement, but also about what pri-orities to set. Time is limited: in the United States, for example, each congres-
sional term covers a  two-year period during which only a small number of issues can 
be addressed. Therefore, a party in power must prioritize which issues to address 
while in office. This raises many questions, for example, which issues are to be 
prioritized? How does the agenda depend on the strength of political power of the 
incumbent, the political climate, the characteristics of the issues, and the institu-
tional rules?
In this paper, we take a first step towards answering these questions by consid-
ering a  two-period model with two parties. In each period one of the parties is in 
power, which we refer to as the incumbent. The incumbent party in each period 
has the  agenda-setting power—it can choose which issue to legislate among many 
issues (for example, immigration, healthcare, education, or tax reform), but its abil-
ity to implement policies on that issue depends on the strength of its power. When 
it has strong power, it can unilaterally choose the policy; when it has weak power, it 
can only implement a policy that makes the opposition party no worse off than the 
status quo. The issues that are not addressed are rolled over to the next period, and 
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the incumbent party in the second period chooses an issue to legislate among these 
remaining issues.
To abstract away from the possibility of strategic manipulations in  agenda setting 
due to  reelection concerns, we deliberately assume that the power transition is exog-
enous, that is, the identity of the party in power in the second period and the strength 
of its power do not depend on the decisions made in the first period.1 Although 
the power transition is exogenous in our setting, the incumbent’s strength of power 
depends on the political institution under which it operates. If the institution has no 
checks and balances, the incumbent always has strong power, but if the institution 
has checks and balances, the incumbent may be in strong or weak power.
We identify issues with their status quos and distinguish between controversial 
and noncontroversial issues. For a controversial issue, the parties would like to move 
policy in opposite directions, but for a noncontroversial issue, there are policies that 
both parties prefer to the status quo. Denoting the two parties by  D and  r , we call a 
 noncontroversial issue a Democratic issue when its status quo is so far away from 
the ideal of party  D that party  D regards party  r ’s ideal as an improvement over the 
status quo. Likewise, we call an issue a republican issue when its status quo is so 
far away from the ideal of party  r that party  r regards party  D ’s ideal as an improve-
ment over the status quo. The issues differ on how pressing they are: an issue whose 
status quo yields a lower payoff for a party is more pressing for that party. We focus 
on partisan preferences in the sense that the most pressing issue for party  D is a 
Democratic issue and the most pressing issue for party  r is a Republican issue, but 
we assume that parties agree which issue is most pressing among the Democratic 
issues, and which issue is most pressing among the Republican issues.
When there is no power fluctuation, that is, the incumbent in period one retains the 
same strength of power in the second period, not surprisingly, its optimal dynamic 
agenda is the same as its optimal static agenda. We also show that when there are 
no checks and balances, that is, the incumbent in each period is in strong power, no 
strategic manipulation of agenda arises in equilibrium. When there are checks and 
balances, however, the incumbent in period one may strategically manipulate its 
agenda. We identify two kinds of manipulation in agenda setting due to dynamic 
concerns. To illustrate these manipulations, suppose party  D is the incumbent in the 
first period.
The first kind of manipulation is when party  D gives priority to a less pressing 
Democratic issue. This can benefit party  D if party  r , when it comes in power, 
addresses the most pressing Democratic issue if it is on the table, but addresses the 
most pressing Republican issue if the most pressing Democratic issue is no longer 
on the table. By giving priority to a less pressing Democratic issue and thus leav-
ing the most pressing Democratic issue still on the table, party  D directs party  r ’s 
agenda towards addressing the most pressing Democratic issue. This is what we call 
the steering effect.
Even when party  D is in power in both periods, giving priority to a less pressing 
Democratic issue can still be beneficial if party  D is in strong power early on but 
1 We discuss what happens when we relax this assumption in the concluding remarks.
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anticipates to lose its political strength over time. Specifically, party  D may take 
advantage of its strong political power to address a somewhat less pressing issue and 
implement its ideal policy, knowing that it will be unable to do so when its power 
diminishes in the future. We call this the  seize-the-moment effect. Although address-
ing a less pressing Democratic issue can be dynamically optimal for the incumbent, 
it is Pareto inefficient since both parties would be better off if the most pressing 
Democratic issue is addressed first instead.
Many have found the Obama administration’s preoccupation with healthcare 
reform at a time of economic crisis puzzling. We offer an explanation in terms 
of strategic agenda setting by regarding the economic crisis as a more press-
ing Democratic issue and healthcare reform as a less pressing Democratic issue. 
The Obama administration pushed through the healthcare legislation when the 
Democratic Party controlled both chambers of Congress. It is plausible that this 
was partly due to the realization that they would lose the opportunity of reform with 
weaker power ( seize-the-moment effect). Indeed, some of the news coverage explic-
itly quoted Obama urging the Democrats to seize the moment, and identified a num-
ber of factors including the Democratic control of the White House and Congress 
among the reasons for why the moment had arisen.2 Moreover, since the economy 
is also a pressing issue for the Republicans, the Democrats could still benefit if the 
Republican Party came in power and addressed the economic issue (the steering 
effect).
The second kind of manipulation is when party  D gives priority to the most press-
ing Republican issue. This can benefit party  D if party  r , when it comes in power, 
addresses the most pressing Republican issue if it is still on the table, but addresses 
the most pressing Democratic issue when the most pressing Republican issue is no 
longer on the table. Note that if party  r addresses a Democratic issue, it implements 
its ideal independent of its strength of power since party  D views party  r ’s ideal to 
be an improvement over status quo for a Democratic issue, and party  D benefits. By 
contrast, if party  r addresses a Republican issue, it either implements its ideal or it 
implements a policy that makes party  D just as well off as the status quo. If the most 
pressing Republican issue has a status quo that is close to party  D ’s ideal, party  D 
does not gain when party  r addresses a Republican issue, and therefore it has an 
incentive to give priority to a Republican issue to prevent party  r from addressing it. 
This is what we call the preemptive effect.
We can interpret the “triangulation” strategy used by the Clinton administra-
tion to tackle crime, a longstanding Republican issue, as an example of preemptive 
agenda setting. The term is due to the political consultant Dick Morris who was an 
advisor to Bill Clinton. According to Morris (2002), “the essence of triangulation is 
to use your party’s solutions to solve the other side’s problems. Use your tools to fix 
their car.” Indeed, the crime bill addressed a traditionally Republican issue but intro-
duced certain progressive policies, for example, crime prevention programs and a 
ban on assault weapons. Arguably, these had preemptive effects on the Republicans 
and prevented them from implementing more drastic policies. In our model, such 
2 See, for example, “On Health Care, Obama Tries to Seize the Moment,” new York Times, June 18, 2009.
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preemptive agenda setting happens only when the incumbent expects to lose power 
in the future. When the crime issue was tackled, the Democrats controlled both 
the Congress and the presidency, but during the midterm elections of 1994, the 
Democrats lost both chambers of Congress to the Republicans.
Another possible reason for party  D to give priority to a Republican issue is that 
by postponing the most pressing Democratic issue, party  D may be able to imple-
ment a better policy on that issue later on. This happens when party  D is in weak 
power early on but anticipates to gain in political strength in the future. We call this 
the  wait-for-the-moment effect, a  counter-point of the  seize-the-moment effect.
Since strategic manipulations of agenda arise only under a power regime that 
has checks and balances and some of these manipulations lead to inefficiency, our 
results point to a tradeoff of having checks and balances in a political system.
related Literature.—The power of agenda control has long been recognized 
in the context of choosing among different alternatives on a single issue (see, for 
example, the seminal papers on monopoly agenda setting by Romer and Rosenthal 
1978, 1979). Many papers have shown that the order in which alternatives are pit-
ted against each other affects the voting outcome (see, for example, Black 1958, 
McKelvey 1976, Plott and Levine 1978, Banks 1985, amd Barberà and Gerber 
2017). In our model, there are multiple issues instead of a single issue on which 
the players can legislate, and the power of agenda control comes from ordering the 
sequence of issues rather than ordering the sequence of alternatives. An important 
aspect of our model is capacity constraint and scarcity of legislative time, and in that 
sense, it is related to Duggan and Martinelli (2011) and Cˇopicˇ and Katz (2012). As 
in our model, Duggan and Martinelli (2011) look at the selection of an issue among 
multiple issues under a capacity constraint but in the context of media reporting. 
Cˇopicˇ and Katz (2012) consider a model of legislative bargaining over distributive 
policies in which each legislator can make a proposal, but because of limited capac-
ity, only the one chosen by the  agenda setter can be voted on. Unlike our model, 
there is only one issue in their model. A strand of literature analyzes bargaining over 
multiple issues, but the emphasis has mostly been on comparing the case when play-
ers bargain over the issues separately and the case when they bundle them together 
(see, for example, Fershtman 1990, Inderst 2000, Lang and Rosenthal 2001, Chen 
2002, Jackson and Moselle 2002, In and Serrano 2004, and Chen and Eraslan 2013, 
2014). Similar to our paper, Anton and Yao (2012) also consider a dynamic setting, 
but they focus on the effect of delaying an issue on the allocation of influence activ-
ity in the future.
Our paper is also related to studies on the effect of issue selection on election 
outcomes. Dellis (2009) shows that politicians may manipulate policies in order 
to influence the set of issues that is decisive in future elections; Egorov (2012); 
Aragonès, Castanheira, and Giani (2015); and Dragu and Fan (2016) study issue 
selection in political campaigns. Our paper complements these studies since they 
consider what issues candidates choose to focus on in order to get elected, whereas 
we analyze what issues parties choose to address to affect future agenda.
Agenda setting is also an important area of research in communication theory, 
but the focus is on the ability of news media to influence the salience of topics 
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on the public agenda (an early study is McCombs and Shaw 1972). As can been 
seen, “agenda setting” has different meanings in different contexts. Since we use 
the phrase to refer to setting priorities in policymaking, our paper shares the same 
interest with the seminal book by Kingdon (1984), which is a descriptive study 
drawn from interviews, case studies, government documents, party platforms, press 
coverage, and public opinion surveys, but does not provide formal analysis.
We describe our model in Section I and then provide examples in Section II to 
illustrate the strategic manipulations that can arise due to dynamic concerns. We 
discuss two benchmarks—Pareto efficient outcomes and dictatorship outcomes—in 
Section III. We divide our analysis of the dynamic  agenda-setting game into the 
 period 2 problem (Section IV) and the  period 1 problem (Section V) and provide 
some discussion on extensions of our model in Section VI.
I. The Model
There are two parties  D and  r and two periods. In each period  t = 1, 2 , one of 
the parties is in power, and we refer to this party as the incumbent. The incumbent in 
a given period has the  agenda-setting right to choose which issue to legislate among 
many. In period 1, any issue can be legislated, and in period 2, any issue other than 
the one legislated in period 1 can be legislated.
The status quo of an issue is in  핉 . We assume that party  D ’s ideal policy on each 
issue is  D ∈ 핉 , and party  r ’s ideal policy on each issue is  r ∈ 핉 with  r > D . 
At the beginning of period 1, there are  n r issues with status quos to the left of  D ,  n c 
issues with status quos between  D and  r , and  n D issues with status quos to the right 
of  r . The total number of issues is  n =  n r +  n c +  n D . We assume that the set of 
issues is sufficiently rich in the sense that there are at least two issues with status 
quos to the left of  D and at least two issues with status quos to the right of  r at the 
beginning of period  1 , that is,  n D ≥ 2 and  n r ≥ 2 . From now on, we identify an 
issue in a given period with its status quo for ease of exposition. We avoid identify-
ing an issue with its status quo across periods, because once an issue is addressed, 
its status quo changes.
The stage utility for party  i ∈ {D, r} from the policies implemented at time  t 
is additively separable across issues and each party has the same payoff function 
on each issue. Let  z kt denote the policy implemented for issue  k at time  t , and let 
 z t = ( z 1t , … ,  z nt ) . The stage utility of party  i at time  t is given by
  u i ( z t ) =  ∑ 
k=1
n
  v i ( z kt ). 
The dynamic utility for party  i is the sum of the stage utilities  u i ( z 1 ) +  u i ( z 2 ) . 
Suppose in period  1 , an issue with status quo  s 1 is addressed and the policy imple-
mented is  x , and in period  2 , an issue with status quo  s 2 is addressed and the policy 
implemented is  y . Then, the gain in payoff in period  1 for party  i is  v i (x) −  v i ( s 1 ) , 
and the gain in payoff in period  2 for party  i is  v i (x) −  v i ( s 1 ) +  v i (y) −  v i ( s 2 ) . 
Therefore, the total gain in payoff for party  i is  2 [ v i (x) −  v i ( s 1 )] +  v i (y) −  v i ( s 2 ) . 
Notice that once a policy is implemented on an issue, then it is  persistent, and the 
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parties continue to care about the issues that they addressed in the past. This is why 
when an issue is addressed in period  1 , the parties gain in both that period and the 
next period.
We assume  v i is continuous and  single-peaked at  i . We refer to an issue to the 
left of  D as a Republican issue and an issue to the right of  r as a Democratic issue. 
We say that issues between  D and  r are controversial, and issues outside the  [D, r] 
interval are noncontroversial. For the noncontroversial issues, we use a lower index 
to indicate a more extreme status quo. That is, we enumerate the issues in period 1 
so that
  r 1 <  r 2 < ⋯ <  r  n r  < D ≤  c 1 < ⋯ <  c  n c  ≤ r
 <  D  n D  < ⋯ <  D 2 <  D 1 . 
Note that since  v i is  single-peaked, a Democratic issue has a status quo that is so 
bad for party  D that it prefers party  r ’s ideal to the status quo, and a Republican 
issue has a status quo that is so bad for party  r that it prefers party  D ’s ideal to the 
status quo. Moreover, we assume the preferences satisfy a  single-crossing prop-
erty. Specifically, for any  x and  x′ such that  x′ > x , if  v D (x′ ) ≥  v D (x), then  v r (x′ ) >  v r (x) . Many commonly used utility functions, for example,  v i (x) = − (x − i) 2 
or  v i (x) = − | x − i | , satisfy these conditions. We say that issue  s is more pressing 
for party  i than issue  s′ if  v i (s) <  v i (s′ ) . We say that the preferences are partisan if 
the most pressing issue for party  D is a Democratic issue and the most pressing issue 
for party  r is a Republican issue, that is, if  v D ( D 1 ) <  v D ( r 1 ) and  v r ( r 1 ) <  v r ( D 1 ) . 
For most of our analysis, we assume that the preferences are partisan. We focus on 
partisan preferences since they seem plausible, and we discuss what happens under 
non-partisan preferences in footnote 10.
For a given issue being legislated, how a policy is chosen depends on the political 
strength of the incumbent party. If the incumbent party is strong, then it unilaterally 
chooses the policy to implement without any constraint. If it is weak, then it can 
only implement a policy that makes the  out-of-power party no worse off than the sta-
tus quo. Since there are two parties, there are four possible power states denoted by 
s D ,  s r ,  W D , and  W r . The power state in period  t is described by the the realization 
of a random variable  π t ∈ { s D ,  s r ,  W D ,  W r } . If  π t =  s i , party  i is in strong power 
in period  t ; if  π t =  W i , party  i is in weak power in period  t . We assume that the dis-
tribution of  π t (referred to as power transition) is exogenously given, but what power 
states can occur with positive probability depends on the power regime. Specifically, 
under a power regime with no checks and balances, the incumbent always has full 
control of the government, and thus  π t ∈ { s D ,  s r } for  t ∈ {1, 2} . Under a power 
regime with checks and balances, the incumbent can be either strong or weak. We 
analyze what happens after the initial power state  π 1 is realized, and without loss of 
generality, we assume that party  D is the incumbent in the first period. Our analysis 
allows for uncertainty in the power state in the second period.
If a party is in power, then it decides what issue to address and what policy to 
implement on that issue. Since the issue not addressed in the first period rolls over 
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to the second period, there is a dynamic link between the decisions made in the first 
period and the feasible actions in the second period. We use the solution concept 
of subgame perfect equilibrium and we solve the game using backward induction.
Discussion of Assumptions: Our assumption that the incumbent can legislate only 
one issue in each period is motivated by the fact that legislative time is limited. One 
may think that addressing an issue on which both parties can benefit should not take 
up so much time as to block legislation on other issues, but given the complexity of 
reforms, this may not be the case. For example, welfare reform during the Clinton 
administration incurred a long political fight that consumed Congress’s attention 
even though the policy was moving towards the Republican’s ideal.
We assume that once an issue is addressed, it cannot be addressed again. Although 
in practice it is possible that an issue addressed previously is brought to the negoti-
ation table again, in general it seems costly to revisit an issue that has already been 
addressed in the recent past. For example, Glazer and Lohmann (1999) quote Bill 
Clinton as saying “After I sign my name to this bill, welfare will no longer be a polit-
ical issue. … The two parties cannot attack each other over it,” right before signing 
the welfare bill to “end welfare as we know it.” We discuss what happens when the 
parties are allowed to revisit an issue that has been addressed in Section VI. In par-
ticular, we consider the implications of an endogenous status quo when we allow the 
parties to revisit an issue.
We assume that each party’s utility is additively separable across dimensions and 
the utility function on each dimension is the same. These assumptions allow us to 
reduce this  multidimensional problem to a  single-dimensional problem and high-
light the basic ideas in a simple model. Similar manipulations in agenda setting like 
those identified in our paper would arise in a  multidimensional setting in which the 
parties’ ideals and their payoff functions are different across different dimensions, 
but the analysis would be significantly more complicated.
As in many political economy models, we assume that the transition probability 
is independent of the incumbent’s policy choice. (See, for example, Persson and 
Svensson 1989; Tabellini and Alesina 1990; Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski 
2011; and Callander and Hummel 2014.) We discuss what happens when we relax 
this assumption in the concluding remarks.
Finally, we focus on the case with no discounting to avoid more notation. If dis-
counting is introduced, our main results would still hold when the parties are suffi-
ciently patient.
II. Examples
In this section, we use simple examples to illustrate the potential manipulations 
in  agenda setting due to dynamic concerns. For all the examples, we assume that 
D = − 1 and  r = 1 and use figures to illustrate the status quos of the issues, the 
parties’ preferences, and the optimal proposals. In illustrating the optimal proposals, 
we use functions  d and  r :  d(x) is the optimal proposal that party  r makes on an issue 
with status quo  x in a static game when  r is in weak power, and  r (x) is the optimal 
proposal that party  D makes on an issue with status quo  x in a static game when  D is 
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in weak power. (The formal definitions of  d and  r are in Section IV.) For simplicity, 
we assume that the power transition is deterministic in the examples, but as we show 
in the analysis, our results allow for random power transition as well.
Example 1: Party  D addresses a less pressing Democratic issue when it is in weak 
power in period 1 and expects that party  r will come in to weak power in period 2.
Suppose there are two Democratic issues and two Republican issues with 
r 1 = − 1.4 ,  r 2 = − 1.25 ,  D 2 = 1.75 ,  D 1 = 1.9 , and  v i (x) = − | x − i | . These 
issues together with the parties’ preferences are illustrated in Figure 1.
Given that party  D needs to make party  r at least as well off as the status quo in 
order to change policy in period 1, if it addresses issue  D 1 , then it can move the pol-
icy on  D 1 to  0.1 by making party  r just as well off as before. Likewise, if it addresses 
issue  D 2 , then it can move the policy on issue  D 2 to  0.25 by making party  r just 
as well off as before. Since party  D can obtain a better compromise by addressing 
issue  D 1 , it is in the  short-term interest for party  D to address the most pressing 
Democratic issue  D 1 instead of addressing the less pressing Democratic issue  D 2 . 
But as we show below, with dynamic considerations, party  D finds it optimal to roll 
over the most pressing issue to period 2 to induce party  r to address  D 1 in period 2.
To see this, note that if party  D addresses issue  D 1 in period  1 , then party  r 
addresses issue  r 1 in period  2 . This is because party  r can move the policy on 
r 1 towards its ideal by  0.8 (from  − 1.4 to  − 0.6 ) and can move the policy on 
issue  D 2 towards its ideal by  0.75 (from  1.75 to  1 ). Given the utility function 
v r (x) = − | x − r | , party  r cares about only the distance by which it can move a 
policy towards its ideal. As a result, party  r gains more by addressing  r 1 than by 
addressing  D 2 .
By contrast, if party  D addresses issue  D 2 in period  1 , then party  r addresses issue 
D 1 in period  2 since it can move the policy on  D 1 towards its ideal by  0.9 (from  1.9 
to  1 ) whereas it can move policy on  r 1 by only  0.8 (from  − 1.4 to  − 0.6 ). Although 
issue  r 1 is the most pressing issue for party  r , its ability to move the policy on that 
issue is limited given its weak power, whereas it can still implement its ideal policy 
on issue  D 1 . Consequently, when issue  D 1 is still on the table, party  r finds it optimal 
to address it even though it is less pressing than issue  r 1 .
Given that party  D does not gain when party  r addresses issue  r 1 (which hap-
pens when party  D addresses issue  D 1 in the first period) but gains somewhat when 
party  r addresses issue  D 1 (which happens when party  D addresses issue  D 2 in the 
1.90.1
−0.75−1−1.25−1.4 −0.6 1.750.25 1
R1 D
d(R2) d(R1) r(D1) r(D2)
R2 D2R D1
Figure 1. Example 1
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first period), addressing issue  D 1 instead of addressing issue  D 2 in period 1 involves 
future cost. It is straightforward to verify that this future cost outweighs the current 
benefit,3 and as a result, party  D is better off addressing issue  D 2 in period  1 instead 
of addressing  D 1 .
It is also straightforward to verify that it is not optimal for party  D to address 
a Republican issue in period  1 . Specifically, addressing  r 1 or  r 2 is dominated by 
addressing  D 2 in period  1 since in either case, party  r will address  D 1 in period  2 
and the  short-term gain from addressing  D 2 is higher for party  D .
As this example illustrates, a party’s dynamic concerns can lead to manipulations 
in agenda setting in the sense that its optimal dynamic agenda is different from its 
optimal static agenda. Here, dynamic concerns drive party  D to give priority to a less 
pressing Democratic issue. Intuitively, this is dynamically optimal because party  D 
can steer party  r ’s agenda towards addressing the most pressing Democratic issue in 
period  2 when party  r comes into power. The equilibrium is inefficient since both par-
ties would have been better off if the most pressing Democratic issue is addressed first.
Example 2: Party  D addresses a less pressing Democratic issue when it is in 
strong power in period 1 but expects to be in weak power in period 2.
The issues and party  D ’s preferences are the same as in Example 1. Party  r ’s pref-
erences are given by  v i (x) =  1 _2 | x − 1 | if  x ≤ 1 , and  v i (x) = | x − 1 | if  x ≥ 1 . 
The issues together with the parties’ preferences are illustrated in Figure 2.
As in Example 1, it is in the  short-term interest for party  D to address issue  D 1 in 
period  1 but its optimal dynamic agenda gives priority to  D 2 in period  1 . To under-
stand the dynamic incentive in this case, first note that if issue  D 1 is rolled over to 
period 2, then party  D addresses issue  D 1 in period 2, but it addresses issue  D 2 in 
period 2 if  D 1 is already addressed in period  1 .4 Turning to period 1, regardless of 
which issue party  D addresses in period 1, it will move the policy on that issue to 
its ideal since it is in strong power in period 1. It is advantageous for party  D to 
3 By addressing  D 1 in period  1 , the total gain for party  D across the two periods is  1.8 × 2 = 3.6 . If party  D 
addresses issue  D 2 in period  1 , it can move the policy towards its ideal by  1.5 on that issue (from  1.75 to  0.25 ). In 
period  2 , party  r will address issue  D 1 by moving the policy on that issue from  1.9 to its own ideal  1 . Hence, the 
total gain in payoff for party  D across the two periods is  1.5 × 2 + 0.9 = 3.9 , which is higher than  3.6 , the total 
gain for party  D if it addresses issue  D 1 in period  1 .
4 Since party  D is in weak power in period 1, it can move the policy on issue  D 1 towards its ideal by  2.7 (from 
1.9 to  − 0.8 ), on issue  D 2 by  2.25 (from  1.75 to  − 0.5 ), on  r 1 by  0.4 (from  − 1.4 to  − 1 ), and on  r 2 by  0.25 (from − 1.25 to  − 1 ).
1.9−0.8−1−1.25−1.4 1 1.75−0.5
R1 DR2 D2R D1
r(D1) r(D2)
Figure 2. Example 2
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roll over the more pressing issue  D 1 because it can extract a better compromise on 
issue  D 1 than on issue  D 2 if it is in weak power in period  2 . By addressing the less 
pressing issue  D 2 when in strong power, party  D is able to implement its ideal policy 
on  D 2 as well as get a better compromise on issue  D 1 when its power weakens in 
the future. Consequently, party  D finds it optimal to address  D 2 in period 1 to take 
advantage of its strong power.5 We can think of this as a “ seize-the-moment” effect. 
As in Example 1, the outcome is inefficient.
Example 3: Party  D addresses a Republican issue when it is in weak power in 
period  1 but expects party  r to come in to weak power in period  2 .
Suppose there are two Democratic issues and two Republican issues with 
r 1 = − 1.975 ,  r 2 = − 1.2 ,  D 2 = 1.4 ,  D 1 = 1.5 , and  v i (x) = − | x − i | . These 
issues together with the parties’ preferences are illustrated in Figure 3.
It is in the  short-term interest for party  D to address issue  D 1 since it can move 
the policy on issue  D 1 towards its ideal by  1 (from  1.5 to  0.5 ) whereas it can move 
the policy on issue  r 1 towards its ideal by only  0.975 (from  − 1.975 to  − 1 ), but we 
show below that the optimal agenda for party  D is to give priority to the Republican 
issue  r 1 .
To see this, note that if issue  r 1 is rolled over to period 1, then party  r finds 
it optimal to address  r 1 in period 2, but if issue  r 1 is addressed in period 1, then 
party  r finds it optimal to address  D 1 in period 2.6 Since party  r addresses issue  r 1 
regardless of what other issue was addressed in period  1 and party  D ’s  period 1 pay-
off is higher by addressing issue  D 1 instead of  D 2 or  r 2 , it follows that addressing 
issue  D 1 is strictly better than addressing issue  D 2 or  r 2 in period  1 for party  D . So 
we only need to compare the choice between issue  D 1 and issue  r 1 .
5 If party  D addresses issue  D 1 in period  1 , then it can move the policy towards its ideal by  2.9 on that issue (from 
1.9 to  − 1 ). In this case, it addresses issue  D 2 in period 2 by moving the policy on  D 2 from  1.75 to  − 0.5 . Hence, the 
total gain for party  D across the two periods is  2 × 2.9 + 2.25 = 8.05 . If party  D addresses issue  D 2 in period  1 , 
then it can move the policy on that issue towards its ideal by  2.75 on that issue (from  1.75 to  − 1 ). In this case, it 
addresses issue  D 1 in period 2 by moving the policy on that issue by  2.7 (from  1.9 to ideal  − 0.8 ). Hence, the total 
gain in payoff for party  D across the two periods is  2.75 × 2 + 2.7 = 8.2 , which is higher than the total gain for 
party  D if it addresses issue  D 1 in period  1 .
6 When in weak power, party  r can move the policy on  r 1 towards its ideal by  1.95 (from  − 1.975 to  − 0.025 ), 







Figure 3. Examples 3 and 4
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Given that party  D does not gain when party  r addresses issue  r 1 (which hap-
pens when party  D addresses issue  D 1 in the first period) but gains somewhat when 
party  r addresses issue  D 1 (which happens when party  D addresses issue  r 1 in the 
first period), addressing issue  D 1 instead of addressing issue  r 1 in period 1 involves 
long-term costs. It is straightforward to verify that these future costs outweighs the 
short term benefits,7 and as a result, party  D is better off addressing issue  r 1 in 
period 1 instead of addressing  D 1 .
In this example, party  D ’s dynamic incentive drives it to go against its  short-term 
interest and give priority to a Republican issue. Intuitively, party  D preempts party  r 
by giving priority to issue  r 1 since party  D does not benefit if party  r addresses issue 
r 1 but benefits to some degree if party  r addresses  D 1 . Unlike in the previous exam-
ple, the equilibrium outcome is still efficient since there is no Pareto improvement.
Example 4: Party  D addresses a Republican issue when it is in weak power in 
period 1 but expects to have strong power in period 2.
The issues and the parties’ preferences are the same as in Example 3. As in 
Example 3, it is in the  short-term interest for party  D to address issue  D 1 in period 1, 
but its optimal dynamic agenda gives priority to  r 1 in period 1. To understand the 
dynamic incentives in this case, first note that regardless of which issue party  D 
addresses in period 2, it will move the policy on that issue to  D since it is in strong 
power in period 2. As such, if issue  D 1 is rolled over to the second period, then 
party  D addresses issue  D 1 , and it addresses issue  D 2 in period 2 if  D 1 was already 
addressed in period 1. Turning to period 1, the ability of party  D to move the policy 
on Democratic issues towards its ideal is constrained by the condition that it has to 
make party  r no worse off than the status quo. By contrast, party  D can still imple-
ment its ideal on a Republican issue even when in weak power. Consequently, party 
D finds it optimal to address  r 1 in period 1 and postpone addressing  D 1 to period 
2 to take advantage of its strong power in period 2.8 We can think of this as the 
“ wait-for-the-moment” effect.
III. Benchmarks
Dynamically Pareto Efficient outcomes.—The first benchmark we consider 
is dynamically Pareto efficient outcomes. These are the outcomes that are Pareto 
7 If party  D addresses issue  D 1 in period  1 , then it can move the policy towards its ideal by  1 on that issue (from 
1.5 to  0.5 ). In this case, party  r addresses issue  r 1 in period 2 by making party  D indifferent between the new policy 
and the status quo. Hence, the total gain for party  D across the two periods is  2 × 1 = 2 . If party  D addresses issue 
r 1 in period 1 , then it can move the policy towards its ideal by  0.975 on that issue (from  − 1.975 to  − 1 ). In this 
case, party  r addresses issue  D 1 in period 2 by moving the policy on that issue from  1.5 to its own ideal  1 . Hence, 
the total gain in payoff for party  D across the two periods is  0.975 × 2 + 0.5 = 2.45 , which is higher than  2 , the 
total gain for party  D if it addresses issue  D 1 in period  1 .
8 If party  D addresses issue  D 1 in period  1 , then it can move the policy towards its ideal by  1 on that issue (from 
1.5 to  0.5 ). In this case, it addresses issue  D 2 in period 2 by moving the policy on  D 2 from  1.4 to its ideal  − 1 . Hence, 
the total gain for party  D across the two periods is  2 × 1 + 2.4 = 4.4 . If party  D addresses issue  r 1 in period 1 , 
then it can move the policy towards its ideal by  0.975 on that issue (from  − 1.975 to  − 1 ). In this case, it addresses 
issue  D 1 in period 2 by moving the policy on that issue from  1.5 to its ideal  − 1 . Hence, the total gain in payoff 
for party  D across the two periods is  0.975 × 2 + 2.5 = 4.45 , which is higher than the total gain for party  D if it 
addresses issue  D 1 in period 1.
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 efficient subject to the constraint that the policy on only one issue can be changed 
in each period. We impose this constraint since parties in the game we consider can 
change policy on only one issue in each period, so we can think of this as a techno-
logical constraint. In the social planner’s problem, there are four choice variables: 
the issue  s 1 addressed in period 1; the policy implemented on the issue addressed 
in period 1 , denoted by  x ; the issue  s 2 addressed in period 2; and the policy imple-
mented on the issue addressed in period 2 , denoted by  y . Let  s denote the set of the 
issues at the beginning of period  1 , that is,  s = { r 1 ,  r 2 , … ,  r  n r  ,  c 1 ,  c 2 , … ,  c  n c  ,  D 1 ,  D 2 , … ,  D  n D  } .
Formally, a dynamically Pareto efficient outcome solves the following social 
planner’s problem:
(SP)    max   s 1 , x,  s 2 , y  
   v D (x) +  ∑ 
s∈s, s≠ s 1 
  v D (s) +  [ v D (x) +  v D (y) +  ∑ s∈s, s≠ s 1 ,  s 2   v D (s)] 
subject to   v r (x) +  ∑ 
s∈s, s≠ s 1 
  v r (s) +  [ v r (x) +  v r (y) +  ∑ s∈s, s≠ s 1 ,  s 2   v r (s)] ≥  
_
 u 
for some  
_
 u .
We use the following result to discuss efficiency properties of equilibria. All the 
proofs are in the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 1: in any dynamically Pareto efficient outcome, if  s is more press-
ing than  s′ for both parties and issue  s′ is addressed, then issue  s is addressed in 
period 1.
Dictatorship.—We next consider dictatorship. Specifically, suppose party  i is the 
dictator in both periods and it can address one issue in each period. In this case, 
party  i does not face any dynamic  trade-off, and therefore its optimal dynamic 
agenda is the same as its optimal static agenda. Thus, in each period, between issues 
s and  s′ , party  i is better off by addressing issue  s and implementing its ideal policy 
on that issue if  v i (s) <  v i (s′ ) . This implies that the dictator party chooses to address 
the most pressing issue for itself in each period.
no Power Fluctuation.—Dictatorship is a special case in which there is no power 
fluctuation. In the next proposition, we show that more generally, in the absence of 
power fluctuation, the optimal dynamic agenda coincides with the optimal static 
agenda. All the remaining results describe equilibrium properties.
PROPOSITION 2: if there is no power fluctuation, that is, if  π 2 =  π 1 with proba-
bility  1 , then the incumbent addresses issue  k in period 1 only if its period 1 payoff 
is maximized by addressing issue  k .
With no checks and balances, the incumbent is always in strong power. In this 
case, if the incumbent continues to be in power in period  2 , then the power state is 
the same across periods and Proposition 2 implies there is no strategic manipulation 
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in the incumbent’s agenda. With checks and balances, however, the incumbent can 
be in either strong or weak power, and even if it continues to be in power in period 2 , 
the power state may still change, so Proposition 2 no longer applies. Indeed, as illus-
trated in Examples 2 and 4, with checks and balances, the optimal dynamic agenda 
may be different from the optimal static agenda even if the incumbent remains the 
same. In the next section, we analyze what strategic manipulations in agenda setting 
may arise from dynamic concerns in the presence of power fluctuations in general.
IV.  Period 2 Problem
To facilitate the analysis, we define two functions  d and  r as follows. For  x ≤ D , let 
d(x) = max { y ≤ r :  v D (y) ≥  v D (x)} , and for  x ≥ r , let  r (x) = min { y ≥ D : 
v r (y) ≥  v r (x)} . Intuitively,  d(x) is the optimal policy that party  r implements on 
an issue with status quo  x to the left of  D when in weak power, and  r (x) is the opti-
mal policy that party  D implements on an issue with status quo  x to the right of  r 
when in weak power. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate these two functions.
The next proposition characterizes the optimal agenda in period 2. For exposi-
tional simplicity, we assume that when the incumbent is indifferent between address-
ing a Republican issue and addressing a Democratic issue, it chooses the agenda that 
makes the other party better off. Recall that we assume  n r ≥ 2 and  n D ≥ 2 at the 
beginning of the game, which implies that there is at least one Republican issue and 
one Democratic issue in period 2.
PROPOSITION 3:
 (i ) if the incumbent has strong power in period 2 , then it addresses the most 
pressing issue for itself.
 (ii ) if the incumbent has weak power in period 2 , then it addresses either issue  s r 
or issue  s D , where  s r < D is the most extreme republican issue and  s D > r 
is the most extreme Democratic issue. specifically, if party  D is the incumbent, 
then it addresses issue  s r if and only if
 v D (D) +  v D ( s D ) ≥  v D ( s r ) +  v D (r( s D )), 
  and if party  r is the incumbent, then it addresses issue  s D if and only if
  v r (r) +  v r ( s r ) ≥  v r ( s D ) +  v r (d( s r )). 
Proposition 3 implies that the incumbent in period 2 addresses the most pressing 
issue for one of the parties.
V.  Period 1 Problem
The next lemma shows that the incumbent in period 1 does not address issues 
whose status quos are not extreme. Formally, we have the following result.
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LEMMA 1: The incumbent in period 1 does not address  r i or  D i with  i ≥ 3 , or any 
controversial issue.
To prove Lemma 1, we show that addressing issue  r 2 dominates addressing 
issue  r i with  i ≥ 3 for the incumbent in period 1. This is because addressing issue  r 2 
gives the incumbent a strictly higher payoff in period 1 and by Proposition 3; the 
choice of the incumbent in period 2 is the same regardless of whether issue  r 2 or 
r i was addressed in period 1. A similar argument shows that addressing issue  D 2 
dominates addressing issue  D i with  i ≥ 3 and addressing any controversial issue is 
dominated by addressing either  D 2 or  r 2 in period 1.
Lemma 1 implies that if there are at least two Democratic issues and two 
Republican issues at the beginning of the game, then it is without loss of generality 
to consider the  agenda-setting problem when there are two Democratic issues and 
two Republican issues. For the remainder of this section, this is the case that we 
analyze.
Since controversial issues are not addressed in either period when there are at 
least two Democratic issues and two Republican issues at the beginning of the 
game by Lemma 1 and Proposition 3, the payoffs from the controversial issues do 
not affect the parties’ choices. Hence, when we discuss the parties’ payoffs in the 
D = r(x′) x′r(x) xR
R = d(x′)x′ x D d(x)
Figure 4.  d( · ) 
Figure 5.  r ( · ) 
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remainder of this section, we omit the payoffs from controversial issues.9 We next 
establish that no matter what the power transition is, party  D does not give priority 
to a less pressing Republican issue.
PROPOSITION 4: regardless of the power transition, party  D does not address  r 2 
in period 1 , that is, party  D does not give priority to a less pressing republican issue.
We prove Proposition 4 by showing that addressing the more pressing issue  r 1 
instead of issue  r 2 in period 1 gives party  D a higher dynamic payoff regardless of 
the power transition. First, note that regardless of its strength of power in period 1, 
if party  D addresses a Republican issue, it moves the policy on that issue to its 
ideal. Hence, party  D ’s  period 1 payoff is higher by addressing issue  r 1 than by 
addressing issue  r 2 . Moreover, similar to the argument for Proposition 2 (which 
concerns the case when there is no power fluctuation), if party  D continues to 
be in power in period 2 , its period 2 payoff is also higher if issue  r 1 instead of 
issue  r 2 is addressed in period 1. The interesting case is when party  r comes in to 
power in period 2, and its choice of agenda varies with what issue has been addressed 
by party  D . If party  r is in strong power, this arises if issue  r 1 is more pressing than 
issue  D 1 , and issue  D 1 is in turn more pressing than issue  r 2 for party  r . In this case, 
by the  single-crossing property, party  D also finds issue  D 1 more pressing than 
issue  r 2 . Hence, party  D is better off if issue  r 2 remains at its status quo (which 
happens if party  r addresses issue  D 1 in period 2) than if issue  D 1 remains at its 
status quo (which happens if party  r addresses issue  r 1 in period 2). It follows that 
party  D is better off in period 2 by addressing issue  r 1 first to induce its rival to 
address issue  D 1 subsequently than by addressing  r 2 first to induce its rival to 
address  r 1 subsequently. This implies that if party  r is expected to come in strong 
power in period 2 , party  D receives a higher dynamic payoff by addressing the more 
pressing issue  r 1 than  r 2 in period 1. A similar, albeit more involved, argument 
shows that if party  r is expected to come in to weak power in period 2 , party  D also 
receives a higher dynamic payoff by addressing the more pressing issue  r 1 than  r 2 
in period 1. Since party  D receives a higher dynamic payoff by addressing  r 1 than 
addressing  r 2 no matter what the power state in period 2 is, it follows that party  D 
does not address  r 2 in period 1 regardless of the power transition, even when there 
is uncertainty in the power transition.
Does party  D ever give priority to a less pressing Democratic issue? As we show 
in the following subsections, the answer depends on the power transition and the 
degree of polarization between the two parties. Before we turn to different power 
transitions, we provide the following lemma, which gives a useful necessary 
 condition for party  D to give priority to a less pressing Democratic issue when the 
9 When the set of issues is sparse, it is possible that controversial issues are addressed in equilibrium as illus-
trated by the following example. Suppose party  D is in strong power in period 1 and is expected to be in weak 
power in period 2. Suppose also that there are two issues  r 1 and  c 1 in period 1 with  r 1 < D <  c 1 < r . If 
 v D ( r 1 ) <  v D ( c 1 ) , then it is in the  short-term interest for party  D to give priority to issue  r 1 . However, the opti-
mal dynamic agenda for party  D may be to give priority to issue  c 1 . Intuitively, since issue  c 1 is controversial, 
party  D addresses it when it has the political power to change the policy on issue  c 1 and postpones tackling 
issue  r 1 . Because the parties have common ground on issue  r 1 , it enables party  D to implement its ideal even when 
in weak power.
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incumbent’s strength of power is the same across periods (that is, either the incum-
bents are strong in both periods or they are weak in both periods).
LEMMA 2: suppose the incumbent’s strength of power is the same in both periods. 
if party  D addresses issue  D 2 in period 1 , then it must be the case that the probabil-
ity of party  r coming in to power in period 2 is sufficiently high, and that if party  r 
comes in to power in period 2 , then it addresses issue  D 1 if  D 2 was addressed in 
period 1, and it addresses issue  r 1 if  D 1 was addressed in period 1.
When the incumbent’s strength of power is fixed over time, power fluctuates only 
when the opposition party comes in to power in period 2. Hence, by Proposition 2, 
for party  D to give priority to the less pressing Democratic issue in period 1 , the 
probability that party  r comes in to power in period 2 must be sufficiently high. 
Lemma 2 says that it also must be the case that party  D ’s agenda in period 1 affects 
the agenda of party  r should it come in to power in period 2. Specifically, if the 
most pressing Democratic issue has been addressed, then party  r addresses the most 
pressing Republican issue, but if the most pressing Democratic issue is still on the 
table, then party  r addresses it.
A. no checks and Balances
Consider a power regime without checks and balances. In this case, the incum-
bent in each period has strong power and can implement its ideal policy on the 
issue of its choice. Party  D ’s  period 1 payoff is clearly higher if it addresses 
issue  D 1 than if it addresses issue  D 2 . If party  D continues to be in power in period 2 , 
then, as shown in Proposition 2, party  D is better off by addressing  D 1 than  D 2 in 
period 1. Furthermore, since  r 1 is the most pressing issue for party  r , if party  r 
comes in to power in period 2 , it would address  r 1 regardless of whether  D 1 or  D 2 
was addressed in period 1. It follows that there is no gain in its  period 2 payoff if 
party  D gives priority to issue  D 2 , and therefore it does not give priority to  D 2 in 
period 1. In the next proposition, we show that party  D does not benefit from giving 
priority to a Republican issue either, implying that it addresses the most pressing 
Democratic issue  D 1 in period 1. So without checks and balances, the incumbent’s 
optimal dynamic agenda coincides with its optimal static agenda.
PROPOSITION 5: With no checks and balances, party  D addresses issue  D 1 in 
period 1.
We give some intuition for why party  D does not give priority to a Republican 
issue when there are no checks and balances. Again, we only need to consider what 
happens if party  r comes in to power in period 2 since party  D ’s dynamic payoff is 
higher by addressing issue  D 1 in period 1 in the event that it continues to be in power 
in period 2. Note that if party  D addresses  D 1 in period 1 , then party  r would address 
issue  r 1 in period 2 if it comes in to power. In this case, by the end of period 2 , one 
issue is moved to  D ’s ideal, another issue is moved to  r ’s ideal, and issues  D 2 and 
 r 2 remain unaddressed. If party  D addresses  r 1 in period 1 , then party  r would 
VoL. 9 no. 2 17CHEN AND ERASLAN: DYNAMIC AGENDA SETTING
address either issue  D 1 or issue  r 2 in period 2. Consider first the case when party  r 
addresses issue  D 1 in period 2. In this case too, by the end of period 2 , one issue 
is moved to  D ’s ideal, another issue is moved to  r ’s ideal, and issues  D 2 and  r 2 
remain unaddressed, implying that party  D ’s period 2 payoff is the same regardless 
of whether it addresses issue  D 1 or  r 1 in period 1. Since party  D ’s  period 1 payoff is 
higher by addressing  D 1 than addressing  r 1 in period 1 , party  D should give priority 
to issue  D 1 . Lastly, consider the case when party  r addresses issue  r 2 in period 2. 
Note that party  D is worse off if party  r addresses issue  r 2 than if party  r addresses 
issue  D 1 . Therefore, by transitivity, party  D does not give priority to issue  r 1 in this 
case as well.10
B. checks and Balances
With checks and balances, the incumbent in each period can be either weak or 
strong, and the possibilities of power transition become richer. To compare with the 
regime without checks and balances, we first consider the case in which the incum-
bent is always weak.
Weak Incumbent in Both Periods: In contrast to the case in which there are no 
checks and balances and therefore the incumbent is always in full control, dynamic 
concerns may drive party  D to give priority to a less pressing Democratic issue 
when the incumbent is weak in each period. To understand the difference, recall 
that by Lemma 2, if party  D addresses  D 2 in period 1 , it must be the case that if 
party  r comes in to power in period 2 , party  r would address  D 1 if it is still on the 
table but would address  r 1 if  D 1 is no longer on the table. A necessary condition for 
this is that between issues  D 1 and  r 1 , party  r prefers to address issue  D 1 . Since the 
most pressing issue for party  r is  r 1 , this clearly cannot be satisfied if  r comes in 
strong power, but it can still be satisfied if  r comes in weak power. This is because 
when party  r is in weak power, the policies that it can implement on a Republican 
issue is constrained by the opposition party  D , but party  r can still implement its 
ideal on a Democratic issue, which makes it more attractive for party  r to address a 
Democratic issue when in weak power. Hence, when the incumbent is weak in both 
periods, party  D may affect party  r ’s agenda in period 2 by giving priority to issue 
D 2 , and thus leaving  D 1 still on the table. This manipulation is beneficial to party  D 
if the gain in its  period 2 payoff more than compensates the loss in its  period 1 pay-
off. We call this the steering effect since the reason for party  D to give priority to the 
less pressing issue  D 2 is that it can then steer party  r ’s agenda towards addressing 
D 1 . By Proposition 1, steering is inefficient since both parties would benefit if issue 
D 1 , which is more pressing for both parties, is addressed in period 1 instead.
10 When preferences are non-partisan, it is possible that party  D gives priority to a less pressing Democratic 
issue. Specifically, if  v r ( D 1 ) <  v r ( r 1 ) <  v r ( D 2 ) ,  v D ( D 2 ) −  v D ( D 1 ) <  v D ( r 1 ) −  v D ( D 2 ) , and it is sufficiently 
likely that party  r comes in power in period 2 , then party  D addresses  D 2 in period 1. Another interesting case is 
when the parties have non-partisan preferences and the most pressing issue has a sufficiently bad status quo for both 
parties. We can think of this as a crisis. For example, if  D 1 is the most pressing issue with a sufficiently bad status 
quo for both parties, then party  D addresses  D 1 even under  non-partisan preferences. Not surprisingly, there is no 
manipulation in agenda setting when the parties face a crisis.
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We say that the preferences are strongly partisan if  v D ( D 1 ) +  v D (D) <  v D ( r 1 ) +  v D (r ( D 1 )) and  v r ( r 1 ) +  v r (r) <  v r ( D 1 ) +  v r (d( r 1 )) . Note that since  v D (D) ≥  v D (r ( D 1 )) and  v r (r) ≥  v r (d( r 1 )) , strongly partisan preferences imply partisan 
preferences. If the preferences are strongly partisan, then party  r prefers to address 
issue  r 1 between issues  r 1 and  D 1 even when in weak power, and this implies that 
party  D would not give priority to issue  D 2 in period 1. One may conjecture that 
when the incumbent is weak in both periods, if preferences are strongly partisan, 
then party  D always addresses issue  D 1 in period 1 , an analog of Proposition 5. But 
as the next proposition shows, unlike what happens with no checks and balances, 
party  D may still go against its  short-term interest and address issue  r 1 instead of  D 1 
in period 1 when the incumbent is weak in both periods.
PROPOSITION 6: if the incumbent is weak in both periods, 
 (i) party  D may address  D 2 in period 1, that is, party  D may give priority to a 
less pressing Democratic issue, but if the preferences are strongly partisan, 
party  D does not give priority to issue  D 2 ; 
 (ii) even if the preferences are strongly partisan, party  D may still give priority to 
the republican issue  r 1 in period 1.
We have already discussed the steering effect that drives party  D to give priority 
to a less pressing Democratic issue; as to party  D giving priority to a Republican 
issue, we can think of it as preemptive agenda setting. If party  D does not address the 
most pressing Republican issue when in power, then the opposition party will surely 
address it if it comes in to power in the next period. Since party  D typically does 
not benefit when party  r addresses a Republican issue but benefits to some degree 
if party  r addresses a Democratic issue, party  D may have the incentive to preemp-
tively tackle the most pressing Republican issue and induce the opposition party to 
address the most pressing Democratic issue when it comes in power. For preemp-
tion to be successful, party  r should prefer to address  D 1 between issues  D 1 and  r 2 , 
which is still possible under strongly partisan preferences, provided that the status 
quo of issue  r 2 is not too far from party  r ’s ideal. Under strongly partisan prefer-
ences, party  D ’s optimal static agenda is to address  D 1 even when the incumbent is 
weak in both periods, and therefore giving priority to  r 1 goes against its  short-term 
interest. But unlike the steering effect which is necessarily inefficient, preemption 
can still be efficient since  r 1 is the most pressing issue for party  r .
The preemptive effect we identify here is somewhat analogous to the preemptive 
experimentation in Callander and Hummel (2014). In both models, the party in 
power goes against its short-term interest in order to prevent more drastic actions by 
the opposition party in case it comes in to power in the future. However, our paper 
concerns agenda setting, whereas Callander and Hummel (2014) concerns experi-
mentation in policymaking.
General Power Transitions: With checks and balances, power fluctuations may 
involve the same party being the incumbent in both periods, but with its strength of 
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power changing over time. This gives rise to new dynamic effects in agenda setting, 
as we show below.
The following proposition shows that the conditions we established for party  D 
to give priority to a less pressing Democratic issue when the incumbent is weak in 
both periods and to have it ruled out when there are no checks and balances can be 
extended in the following sense: if the party in power in period 2 is likely to be strong, 
then party  D does not give priority to issue  D 2 (an extension of Proposition 5), but 
if the party in power in period 2 is likely to be weak, then party  D may give priority 
to issue  D 2 (an extension of Proposition 6, part (i)).
PROPOSITION 7: 
 (i) if it is sufficiently likely that the party in power in period 2 is strong, then 
party  D does not give priority to the less pressing Democratic issue  D 2 in 
period 1. 
 (ii) if it is sufficiently likely that the party in power in period 2 is weak, then party 
D may give priority to the less pressing Democratic issue  D 2 in period 1.
For part (ii), party  D may have the incentive to give priority to the less pressing 
issue  D 2 due to two effects. First, if party  D expects to lose power to party  r , then it 
may want to roll over the more pressing issue  D 1 to induce  r to tackle it in period 2. 
This is similar to the steering effect identified when the incumbent is weak in both 
periods. Second, if party  D expects to be still in power, but only weakly, then it 
may want to roll over the more pressing issue  D 1 to extract a better compromise. 
This is reminiscent of Romer and Rosenthal (1979), which shows that a monopoly 
 agenda-setter is better off when the status quo is further away from the opponent’s 
ideal. Our result extends Romer and Rosenthal (1979) by providing an implication 
of their insight in a dynamic  multiple-issue setting. Note that unlike the steering 
effect, the second effect arises only when the same party is still in power in period 2 
but with weakened political strength—this is the “ seize-the-moment” effect dis-
cussed in Example 2.
Another new effect that may arise is when the incumbent is in weak power 
in period 1 but expects to gain in political strength in the future. As we show in 
Proposition 8, party  D may give priority to a Republican issue against its  short-term 
interest in this case (under strongly partisan preferences, party  D ’s optimal static 
agenda is to address issue  D 1 ). The reason here for party  D to give priority to a 
Republican issue is different from the preemptive effect when the incumbent is 
weak in both periods. Party  D benefits from giving priority to a Republican issue 
here because by postponing the most pressing issue  D 1 until it gains enough polit-
ical strength, it will be able to implement its ideal policy on that issue. This is the 
“ wait-for-the-moment” effect discussed in Example 4.
PROPOSITION 8: Even if the preferences are strongly partisan, party  D may give 
priority to the republican issue  r 1 in period 1 if it is in weak power in period 1 but 
expects to be in strong power in period 2.
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We summarize the results in Table 1. The rows correspond to  π 1 , the power state 
in period 1, and the columns correspond to  π 2 , the power state in period 2. The 
entries describe the possible agenda manipulations under different power transitions 
and the effects that give rise to them. The table includes only deterministic power 
transitions; with random power transitions, agenda manipulations may arise from a 
combination of the different effects, weighted by the probability of the future power 
state.
VI. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Understanding agenda setting in a  multi-issue environment with limited capac-
ity is an important research question, but it has received limited attention in the 
literature. Our analysis has shown the different strategic manipulations that may 
arise under different power transitions when the agenda formed in an earlier period 
has dynamic implications. Even though our model is stylized, we view a main 
contribution of our paper as providing a simple but plausible framework that one 
can build upon to address further questions about agenda setting. Indeed, there are 
many interesting directions in which to extend the model, and we discuss some of 
them here.
Revisiting an Issue: One assumption we have made is that once an issue is 
addressed, it cannot be addressed again in the next period. In the following example, 
we illustrate that if an issue addressed earlier is allowed to be revisited, then it cre-
ates an endogenous status quo. In this case, in addition to strategic manipulations in 
agenda setting, an incumbent may implement a policy that is not statically optimal 
on the issue of its choice.
Example 5: Suppose  D = − 1 ,  r = 1 , and  v i (x) = − | x − i | .
For simplicity, suppose that there are only two Democratic issues with  D 1 = 2.5 , 
D 2 = 2 ; party  D is in strong power in period 1, and party  r is in strong power 
in period 2. If an issue that has been addressed in period 1 cannot be revisited in 
period 2 , then in equilibrium, party  D addresses issue  D 1 by moving the policy on 
that issue to its ideal  D in period 1, and party  r addresses the remaining issue  D 2 in 
period 2 by moving the policy on that issue to its ideal  r .
If an issue that has been addressed in period 1 is allowed to be revisited in period 2 , 
however, it is no longer optimal for party  D to address  D 1 in period 1. To see this, 
Table 1
 π 1 \ π 2  s D  s r  W D  W r 
 s D no power fluctuation 
no manipulation
no checks and balances 
no manipulation may give priority to  D 2 (seize the moment)
may give priority to  D 2 (steering)
 W D 
may give priority to  r 1 (wait for the moment)
may give priority to  r 1 (preemption)
no power fluctuation 
no manipulation may give priority to  D 2 or  r 1 (steering or preemption)
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suppose party  D addresses  D 1 in period 1. Note that if it moves the policy on that 
issue  D 1 to its ideal  D , then, in period 2 , party  r will revisit the issue and move the 
policy to its ideal  r . In this case, the total gain in payoff for party  D is  3.5 + 1.5 = 5 . 
If party  D addresses issue  D 1 by moving the policy on that issue to zero instead, 
then, in period 2 , party  r will address issue  D 2 by moving the policy on that issue to 
its ideal  r .11 In this case, party  D ’s total gain in payoff is  2.5 × 2 + 1 = 6 . Hence, 
if party  D addresses issue  D 1 in period 1 , it is optimal to move the policy on that 
issue to zero instead of all the way to its ideal  D to prevent party  r from revisiting 
the issue in period 2. Similarly, if party  D addresses issue  D 2 in period 1 , it is opti-
mal to move the policy on that issue to  − 0.5 instead of all the way to its ideal so that 
party  r does not revisit the issue in period 2. In this case, party  r addresses issue  D 1 
in period 2 by moving the policy to its ideal  r = 1 . Hence, the total gain in payoff 
to party  D is  2.5 × 2 + 1.5 = 6.5 , which implies that it is better for party  D to 
address issue  D 2 . This example shows that when an issue can be revisited, not only 
does party  D give priority to the less pressing issue  D 2 , it also implements a policy 
on that issue which is not statically optimal. In particular, the policy it implements 
is more moderate than if the issue cannot be revisited.12
Endogenous Power Transitions: We have assumed for simplicity that the power 
transition is exogenous. Many papers in the political economy literature make the 
same assumption, but one exception is Azzimonti (2011). She assumes that voters 
care about policies chosen by politicians as well as another dimension unrelated 
to policies (for example, valence). Since voters are  forward looking and the pol-
iticians’ policy preferences are known, in equilibrium the reelection probabilities 
are constant in the chosen policies. If we incorporate  forward-looking voters in our 
model, we obtain something similar: the power transition does not depend on the 
incumbent’s chosen agenda and power fluctuation comes from the uncertainty about 
another dimension independent of the incumbent’s choice.
It is possible that voters are not all forward looking or there may be informa-
tion asymmetries between politicians and voters that lead to retrospective voting. 
In particular, a party’s constituents may punish the party for not addressing the 
most pressing issue, perhaps because they do not understand the strategic advan-
tage of doing so or they make negative inferences about the politician’s type. This 
will strengthen a party’s incentive to address the most pressing issue and dilute its 
incentive to manipulate the agenda, but the basic insights we obtained in our paper 
still hold.
Endogenous Number of Issues Addressed: We have considered the stark case 
in which only one issue can be addressed in a period. Although this approach has 
provided useful insight into parties’ dynamic incentives in setting their agendas, one 
should think that the number of major issues that are tackled in a political cycle is not 
11 We assume that party  r addresses issue  D 2 with the status quo at two even though it is indifferent between 
addressing  D 2 and issue  D 1 whose status quo is at zero in period 2. Without this assumption, party  D does not have 
a best response in period 1.
12 The moderation effect on policy through endogenous status quo is reminiscent of Bowen, Chen, and Eraslan 
(2014). A similar effect also appears in Buisseret and Bernhardt (2015).
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fixed. Understanding what determines the scope of a party’s agenda, in  particular, 
when a party is able to push an expansive agenda and when it is stuck in gridlock is 
an interesting and important question.
Longer Time Horizon: The state variable in our model has many dimensions, 
making the analysis beyond two periods difficult. A full analysis of a model with a 
longer time horizon is beyond the scope of our paper, but we conjecture that similar 
effects as those we identify in the paper would arise, but new effects may arise with 
a longer horizon (for example, an incumbent may choose to address an issue to pre-
empt an anticipated preemption).
Combining Issues: Capacity constraint drives the inefficiency that arises in our 
paper. While we believe that many important issues are too complex to be dealt 
with within one legislative cycle, there are ways to alleviate this inefficiency in 
democratic regimes. For example, one way would be by adding amendments that 
concern smaller issues to a bill about a larger issue. Another way would be through 
vote trading over different issues legislated in different cycles. How the practice of 
logrolling affects agenda setting is an interesting question beyond the scope of our 
paper.
Issue Ownership: In the United States and other democratic countries, a party 
may “own” certain issues because it has a reputation of having expertise regard-
ing them and is perceived to be better at handling them than other parties. In our 
paper, we assume that neither party has an advantage in addressing any particular 
issue and thus abstract away from issue ownership. There is research on how issue 
ownership affects campaigning and party rhetoric (see, for example, Petrocik 1996 
and Holian 2004), but to the best of our knowledge, there is no paper on how it 
affects agenda setting. It would be an interesting extension to incorporate issue 
ownership in our model and see the effect it has on agenda setting. Indeed, Holian 
(2004) discusses Clinton’s rhetoric about stealing the crime issue, an issue tra-
ditionally owned by the Republican Party. With idiosyncratic abilities to handle 
different issues, an incumbent may strategically choose to give priority to an issue 
with which it is perceived not to be especially good in order to steal the electorate’s 
reason to elect the other party. This suggests that another explanation for Clinton’s 
triangulation strategy (discussed in the context of the preemptive effect in our anal-
ysis) is office motivation, which complements the policy motivation we focus on 
in this paper.
 Nonstationary Preferences: In our model, we assume that preferences do not 
change over time, which rules out the possibility that an issue that is not the most 
pressing today can become the most pressing issue in the future if no new policy is 
implemented (for example, climate change). New questions arise in the presence of 
 nonstationary preferences—for example, does a party give priority to an issue that 
is not especially pressing today to prevent it from becoming serious in the future 
or does it delay addressing the issue to make it urgent for the opposition party to 
tackle? We leave these interesting questions for future research.
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Mathematical Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose  ( s 1 ∗,  s 2 ∗,  x ∗ ,  y ∗ ) is a dynamically efficient outcome, where  s t ∗ is the issue 
addressed in period  t ,  x ∗ is the policy implemented on issue  s 1 ∗, and  y ∗ is the policy 
implemented on issue  s 2 ∗. In what follows, we prove the proposition by contradiction.
First, consider the case in which  s 1 ∗ = s′ . If  s 2 ∗ = s , then the gain in player  i ’s 
dynamic payoff from outcome  (s, s′,  x ∗ ,  y ∗ ) is  2 [ v i ( x ∗ ) −  v i (s)] +  v i ( y ∗ ) −  v i (s′ ) 
and the gain in player  i ’s dynamic payoff from outcome  (s′, s,  x ∗ ,  y ∗ ) is  2 [ v i ( x ∗ ) −  v i (s′ )] +  v i ( y ∗ ) −  v i (s) . Note that  2 [ v i ( x ∗ ) −  v i (s)] +  v i ( y ∗ ) −  v i (s′ ) − 2 [ v i ( x ∗ ) −  v i (s′ )] −  v i ( y ∗ ) +  v i (s) =  v i (s′ ) −  v i (s) , which is strictly greater than zero for 
i ∈ {D, r} since  s is more pressing than  s′ for both parties. It follows that the out-
come  (s, s′,  x ∗ ,  y ∗ ) Pareto dominates  (s′, s,  x ∗ ,  y ∗ ) , a contradiction. If  s 2 ∗ ≠ s , then 
the outcome  (s,  s 2 ∗,  x ∗ ,  y ∗ ) Pareto dominates  (s′,  s 2 ∗,  x ∗ ,  y ∗ ) since  v i ( x ∗ ) −  v i (s) >  v i ( x ∗ ) −  v i (s′ ) , a contradiction.
Next consider the case in which  s 1 ∗ ≠ s and  s 2 ∗ = s′ . Since  v i (s) <  v i (s′ ) for 
i ∈ {D, r} , we have  v i ( y ∗ ) −  v i (s) >  v i ( y ∗ ) −  v i (s′ ) . It follows that the outcome ( s 1 ∗, s,  x ∗ ,  y ∗ ) Pareto dominates  ( s 1 ∗, s′,  x ∗ ,  y ∗ ) , a contradiction.
Hence, in any dynamically Pareto efficient outcome, if issue  s′ is addressed, 
issue  s is addressed in period 1. ∎
B. Proof of Proposition 2
We show that if the incumbent’s period 1 payoff is higher by addressing issue  s 1 instead 
of addressing issue  s 1 ′ , then its  period 2 payoff is also higher if issue  s 1 was addressed 
than if issue  s 1 ′ was addressed in period 1. Proposition 2 follows from this result.
Let  i denote the incumbent in both periods and let  a i π (s) be the policy that can 
be implemented by party  i that maximizes its static payoff if it addresses issue  s in 
power state  π . Note that  a i π (s) does not depend on the time period.
Since party  i ’s period 1 payoff is higher by addressing issue  s 1 than by address-
ing issue  s 1 ′ , we have  v i ( a i  π 1  ( s 1 )) +  v i ( s 1 ′ ) ≥  v i ( a i  π 1  ( s 1 ′ )) +  v i ( s 1 ) . Suppose if 
issue  s 1 ′ was addressed in period 1 , then the optimal issue to address in period 2 is 
issue  s 2 . Consider the following cases. (i) Suppose  s 2 ≠  s 1 . In this case, if issue  s 1 
was addressed in period 1 , then the optimal issue to address in period 2 is either 
issue  s 2 or issue  s 1 ′ . If it is issue  s 2 , it follows immediately that party  i ’s period 2 
payoff is higher if issue  s 1 instead of  s 1 ′ was addressed in period 1. If it is issue  s 1 ′ , 
since party  i ’s  period 1 payoff is higher by addressing  s 1 instead of  s 1 ′ , its period 
2 payoff is also higher when  s 1 is addressed in period 1 and  s 1 ′ is addressed in 
period 2 than when  s 1 ′ is addressed in period 1 and  s 1 is addressed in period 2. (ii) Suppose  s 2 =  s 1 . In this case, party  i ’s  period 2 payoff if issue  s 1 was addressed 
in period 1 and issue  s 1 ′ is addressed in period 2 is the same as its  period 2 payoff if 
issue  s 1 ′ was addressed in period 1 and issue  s 2 =  s 1 is addressed in period 2. Since 
party  i achieves the highest  period 2 payoff by addressing issue  s 2 if issue  s 1 ′ was 
addressed in period 1 , it follows that party  i ’s period 2 payoff is higher if issue  s 1 
was addressed than if issue  s 1 ′ was addressed in period 1. ∎
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C. Proof of Proposition 3
To show part (i), note that when the incumbent is in strong power, it can move the 
policy on any issue to its ideal. Since the most pressing issue for party  i gives it the 
lowest status quo payoff, it follows immediately that in period 2 , party  i achieves the 
highest payoff by addressing the most pressing issue for itself and moving the policy 
on that issue to its ideal.
To show part (ii), suppose party  D is in weak power in period 2. Note that if 
party  D addresses a Republican issue, it moves the policy on that issue to its ideal 
D , and if party  D addresses a Democratic issue  s , it moves the policy on that issue 
to  r (s) . Let  s ̂ be the issue that party  D addresses. If  s ̂ is a Republican issue, then the 
difference in party  D ’s  period 2 payoff if it addresses issue  s r and if it addresses 
issue  s ̂ is  v D ( s ̂ ) −  v D ( s r ) . Since  s r ≤  s ̂ < D and  v D (x) is increasing for  x < D , 
addressing  s r is better than addressing any other Republican issue. Similarly, if  s ̂ is 
a Democratic issue, then the difference in party  D ’s  period 2 payoff if it addresses 
issue  s D and if it addresses issue  s ̂ is  v D (r ( s D )) +  v D ( s ̂ ) −  v D (r ( s ̂ )) −  v D ( s D ) . Since 
D ≤ r ( s D ) ≤ r ( s ̂ ) <  s ̂ <  s D and  v D (x) is decreasing for  x ≥ D , it follows that 
addressing  s D is better than addressing any other Democratic issue. Since party  D 
cannot change the status quo of a controversial issue when it is in weak power, it 
follows that it either addresses issue  s r or issue  s D if there is at least one Democratic 
issue and one Republican issue. In this case, since the difference in party  D ’s  period 
2 payoff if it addresses issue  s r and if it addresses issue  s D is  v D (D) +  v D ( s D ) − 
v D (s) −  v D (r ( s D )) , it follows that party  D addresses issue  s r if and only if  v D (D) + 
v D ( s D ) ≥  v D (s) +  v D (r ( s D )) . A similar argument proves the result if party  r is in 
weak power in period 2. Since party  D does not address a controversial issue when 
in weak power, if all noncontroversial issues are Democratic (Republican) issues, 
party  D addresses the most pressing Democratic (Republican) issue. ∎
D. Proof of Lemma 1
Recall that we assume that the incumbent in period 1 is  D . Consider  r i with 
i ≥ 3 . In what follows, we show that addressing  r 2 gives party  D a higher payoff 
than addressing  r i in period 1. If party  D addresses either  r 2 or  r i , it moves the 
policy on that issue to its ideal  D . Hence, the gain in payoff in period 1 to party  D 
from addressing  r 2 instead of  r i in period 1 is  v D ( r i ) −  v D ( r 2 ) > 0 . Note also 
that if either  r 2 or  r i is addressed in period 1 , then both  r 1 and  D 1 are rolled over 
to period 2 , and by Proposition 3, either party’s choice in period 2 is not affected. 
Hence, it is strictly better for party  D to address  r 2 instead of  r i in period 1. A 
similar argument shows that it is strictly better for party  D to address  D 2 than any 
controversial issue or any  D i with  i ≥ 3 . ∎
E. Proof of Proposition 4
Recall that we assume that party  D is the incumbent in period 1 , i.e., 
 π 1 ∈ { s D ,  W D } . We prove the result by showing that addressing  r 1 in period 1 
results in a higher payoff in both periods for party  D than addressing  r 2 . For any 
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π 1 ∈ { s D ,  W D } , if party  D addresses  r 1 or  r 2 , it moves the policy to its ideal  D on 
that issue. Hence, the difference in period 1 payoff to party  D between addressing 
r 1 and addressing  r 2 is  v D ( r 2 ) −  v D ( r 1 ) > 0 . We next show that party  D ’s period 
2 payoff is also higher if it addresses issue  r 1 instead of  r 2 in the first period for any π 2 ∈ { s D ,  W D ,  s r ,  W r } .
Since party  D ’s period 1 payoff is higher by addressing  r 1 instead of  r 2 for any π 1 ∈ { s D ,  W D } , by the argument in Proposition 2, party  D ’s period 2 payoff is 
also higher if  r 1 instead of  r 2 was addressed in the first period if  π 2 =  s D or if 
 π 2 =  W D . So it suffices to consider what happens if  π 2 =  s r or if  π 2 =  W r .(i) Suppose  π 2 =  s r . (a) If  v r ( r 2 ) <  v r ( D 1 ) , then  v r ( r 1 ) <  v r ( D 1 ) . In this 
case, if either  r 1 or  r 2 was addressed in period 1 , party  r addresses the remain-
ing Republican issue ( r 2 or  r 1 ) by moving the policy to  r . Hence, regardless of 
whether  r 1 or  r 2 was addressed in period 1 , party  D ’s  period 2 payoff is  v D (D) + 
v D (r) +  v D ( D 1 ) +  v D ( D 2 ) . (b) If  v r ( r 1 ) >  v r ( D 1 ) , then  v r ( r 2 ) >  v r ( D 1 ) . In 
this case, party  r addresses issue  D 1 in period 2 regardless of whether issue  r 1 or 
r 2 was addressed in period 1 , and the difference in  period 2 payoff for party  D from 
addressing  r 1 in the first period instead of  r 2 is  v D ( r 2 ) −  v D ( r 1 ) > 0 . (c) Finally, 
if  v r ( r 2 ) >  v r ( D 1 ) >  v r ( r 1 ) , then party  r addresses the Democratic issue  D 1 if 
issue  r 2 is rolled over to period 2, but addresses the Republican issue  r 1 if issue 
r 1 is rolled over to period 2. In this case, party  D ’s  period 2 payoff is  v D (D) + 
v D ( r 2 ) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D (r) if he addresses  r 1 in period 1 , and is  v D (r) +  v D (D) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D ( D 1 ) if he addresses  r 2 in period 1. Since  v r ( r 2 ) >  v r ( D 1 ) , by 
the  single-crossing property, it is not possible to have  v D ( D 1 ) >  v D ( r 2 ) , and so 
party  D ’s  period 2 payoff is higher if  r 1 instead of  r 2 was addressed in period 1.(ii) Suppose  π 2 =  W r . Similar to case (i), if party  r addresses the remain-
ing Republican issue or issue  D 1 regardless of whether  r 1 or  r 2 was addressed in 
period 1 , then party  D ’s  period 2 payoff is higher if  r 1 instead of  r 2 was addressed in 
period 1. The remaining case is when party  r addresses issue  D 1 if issue  r 2 is rolled 
over to period 2 but addresses  r 1 if  r 1 is rolled over to period 2. This happens if
(A1)  v r (d( r 2 )) +  v r ( D 1 ) ≤  v r ( r 2 ) +  v r (r) 
and
(A2)  v r (d( r 1 )) +  v r ( D 1 ) ≥  v r ( r 1 ) +  v r (r). 
In this case, party  D ’s  period 2 payoff is  v D (D) +  v D ( r 2 ) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D (r) 
if it addresses  r 1 in period 1 , and  v D (d( r 1 )) +  v D (D) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D ( D 1 ) if it 
addresses  r 2 in period 1. If  v D (d( r 1 )) =  v D ( r 1 ) , then  D ’s  period 2 payoff is higher 
if  r 1 instead of  r 2 was addressed in period 1 since  v D ( r 2 ) >  v D ( r 1 ) and  v D (r) >  v D ( D 1 ) . If  v D (d( r 1 )) ≠  v D ( r 1 ) , then it must be the case that  v D (d( r 1 )) =  v D (r) >  v D ( r 1 ) . In this case, the  period 1 gain in payoff for party  D from 
addressing  r 1 instead of  r 2 is  v D ( r 2 ) −  v D ( r 1 ) > 0 , and the  period 2 gain in pay-
off for party  D from addressing  r 1 instead of  r 2 is  v D ( r 2 ) −  v D ( D 1 ) . If  v D ( r 2 ) ≥  v D ( D 1 ) , then  D is better off addressing  r 1 in the first period, and the conclu-
sion follows. Suppose instead that  v D ( r 2 ) <  v D ( D 1 ) . Since  v D (r) >  v D ( D 1 ) , we 
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have  v D (r) >  v D ( r 2 ) , which implies that  v D (d( r 2 )) >  v D ( r 2 ) . It follows that 
 d( r 2 ) = r , and since  r addresses issue  D 1 if issue  r 2 is rolled over, inequality (A1) implies that  v r ( D 1 ) ≤  v r ( r 2 ) . In this case, by the  single-crossing property, 
we have  v D ( r 2 ) >  v D ( D 1 ) , and therefore  D ’s  period 2 payoff is higher if  r 1 instead 
of  r 2 was addressed in period 1.
To summarize, party  D ’s total payoff is higher by addressing  r 1 than by address-
ing  r 2 in period 1 for any  π 2 ∈ { s D ,  W D ,  s r ,  W r } . Hence, regardless of the power 
transition, party  D does not address  r 2 in period 1. ∎
F. Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose party  D addresses issue  D 2 in period 1 in equilibrium. Since party  D ’s 
 period 1 payoff is higher by addressing issue  D 1 than issue  D 2 in period 1 , it must 
be that its expected payoff in period 2 is higher by addressing issue  D 2 instead of 
issue  D 1 in period 1. Since we assume that the incumbent’s strength of power is the 
same in both periods, if party  D continues to be in power in period 2 , its strength of 
power remains the same. In this case, by the argument in Proposition 2, party  D ’s 
 period 2 payoff is higher if it addresses issue  D 1 instead of  D 2 in period 1. Since 
party  D ’s dynamic payoff is continuous in the distribution of the power state in 
period 2 , it must be the case that party  r comes in power in period 2 with sufficiently 
high probability, and moreover, if party  r comes in to power in period 2 , party  D 
’s  period 2 payoff must be higher if it addresses issue  D 2 instead of issue  D 1 in 
period 1.
Suppose issue  D 1 was addressed in period 1. By Proposition 3, if party  r is in 
power in period 2 , it addresses either issue  r 1 or  D 2 . Suppose party  r addresses 
issue  D 2 . Then it would address issue  D 1 if issue  D 2 was addressed in period 1. That 
is, regardless of whether  D 1 or  D 2 was addressed in period 1 , party  r would address 
the remaining Democratic issue in period 2. Note that regardless of its strength of 
power, party  r moves the policy to its ideal if it addresses a Democratic issue. It 
follows that party  D ’s  period 2 payoff is higher if it addresses issue  D 1 instead of 
issue  D 2 in period 1 , a contradiction. Hence, it must be the case that party  r addresses 
issue  r 1 if issue  D 1 was addressed in period 1.
Suppose issue  D 2 was addressed in period 1. By Proposition 3, if party  r is in 
power in period 2 , it addresses either issue  r 1 or  D 1 . If party  r addresses issue  r 1 , 
then it would also address issue  r 1 if issue  D 1 was addressed in period 1 , which 
implies that party  D ’s  period 2 payoff is higher if it addresses issue  D 1 instead of 
issue  D 2 in period 1 , a contradiction. Hence, it must be the case that party  r addresses 
issue  D 1 if issue  D 2 was addressed in period 1. ∎
G. Proof of Proposition 5
By Proposition 4, party  D does not address issue  r 2 in period 1 in equilibrium. 
Next, consider the choice between issues  D 1 and  D 2 for party  D in period 1. Suppose 
party  r comes in to power in period 2. Since  v r ( r 1 ) <  v r ( D 1 ) <  v r ( D 2 ) , it fol-
lows that regardless of whether  D 1 or  D 2 was addressed in period 1 , party  r addresses 
issue  r 1 in period 2. By Lemma 2, party  D does not address issue  D 2 in period 1.
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Under partisan preferences,  v D ( D 1 ) <  v D ( r 1 ) , implying that party  D ’s  period 1 
payoff is strictly higher by addressing issue  D 1 instead of issue  r 1 . If party  D is in 
power in period 2 , then its  period 2 payoff is higher if it addresses issue  D 1 instead 
of issue  r 1 in period 1 by the argument in Propostion 2. We next show that party  D ’s 
period 2 payoff is weakly higher if it addresses issue  D 1 instead of  r 1 in period 1 
when party  r is in power in period 2. If party  D addresses  D 1 in period 1 , then, since 
v r ( r 1 ) <  v r ( D 1 ) <  v r ( D 2 ) , party  r addresses issue  r 1 in period 2 and party  D ’s 
 period 2 payoff is
  v D (r) +  v D ( r 2 ) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D (D). 
If party  D addresses issue  r 1 in period 1 , then we have either (i) party  r addresses 
issue  D 1 in period 2 , which happens if  v r ( D 1 ) ≤  v r ( r 2 ) , or (ii) party  r addresses 
issue  r 2 in period 2 , which happens if  v r ( r 2 ) <  v r ( D 1 ) . We consider the two cases 
below:
 (i) If party  r addresses  D 1 in period 2 , then party  D ’s period 2 payoff is
  v D (D) +  v D ( r 2 ) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D (r). 
  In this case, party  D ’s  period 2 payoff if it addresses  D 1 and if it addresses  r 1 
in period 1 are the same.
 (ii) If party  r addresses  r 2 in period 2 , then party  D ’s period 2 payoff is
  v D (D) +  v D (r) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D ( D 1 ). 
  In this case, the difference between party  D ’s  period 2 payoff if it addresses 
D 1 and if it addresses  r 1 in period 1 is  v D ( r 2 ) −  v D ( D 1 ) > 0 .
In both cases, party  D ’s period 2 payoff is weakly higher if it addresses issue  D 1 
instead of  r 1 in period 1. Hence, party  D addresses issue  D 1 in period 1. ∎
H. Proof of Proposition 6
We first prove part (i). We establish the result under the assumption that party  r 
comes in to power in period 2 with probability 1 and
(A3)  v r (d( r 1 )) +  v r ( D 1 ) <  v r ( r 1 ) +  v r (r) <  v r (d( r 1 )) +  v r ( D 2 ). 
When  r comes in to power in period 2 , then it addresses  r 1 if  D 1 was addressed in 
period 1, and it addresses  D 1 if  D 2 or  r 1 was addressed in period 1.
If party  D addresses issue  D 1 in period 1 , then its payoff in period 1 is
  v D ( r 1 ) +  v D ( r 2 ) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D (r( D 1 )), 
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and its period 2 payoff is
  v D (d( r 1 )) +  v D ( r 2 ) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D (r( D 1 )). 
If party  D addresses issue  D 2 in period 1 , then its payoff in period 1 is
  v D ( r 1 ) +  v D ( r 2 ) +  v D (r ( D 2 )) +  v D ( D 1 ), 
and its period 2 payoff is
  v D ( r 1 ) +  v D ( r 2 ) +  v D (r ( D 2 )) +  v D (r). 
If party  D addresses issue  r 1 in period 1 , then its payoff in period 1 is
  v D (D) +  v D ( r 2 ) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D ( D 1 ) , 
and its second period payoff is
  v D (D) +  v D ( r 2 ) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D (r). 
It follows that party  D prefers addressing  D 2 to addressing  D 1 and  r 1 in the first 
period if
(A4)    2  v D (r( D 2 )) +  v D ( D 1 ) +  v D (r) +  v D ( r 1 ) 
   > 2  v D ( D 2 ) + 2  v D (r( D 1 )) +  v D (d( r 1 )) 
and
(A5)  2  v D ( r 1 ) + 2  v D (r ( D 2 )) > 2  v D (D) + 2  v D ( D 2 ). 
To sum up, if conditions (A3), (A4), and (A5) are satisfied, then party  D addresses 
D 2 in period 1. Since these conditions can be satisfied under partisan preferences, 
party  D may address  D 2 in period 1 in equilibrium. Under strongly partisan pref-
erences, however, party  r addresses issue  r 1 regardless of whether  D 1 or  D 2 was 
addressed in period 1. Then, by Lemma 2, party  D does not address issue  D 2 in 
period 1 in equilibrium under strongly partisan preferences.
We now prove part (ii). We establish the result under the assumption that 
party  r comes in to power in period 2 with probability  1 and  v r ( r 2 )  +   v r (r) <  v r ( D 1 ) +  v r (d( r 2 )) .
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When  r comes in to power in period 2 , then it addresses  r 1 by moving it to  d( r 1 ) 
if  D 1 was addressed in period 1, and it addresses  D 1 if  r 1 was addressed in period 1.
If party  D addresses issue  D 1 in period 1 , then its  period 1 payoff is  v D ( r 1 ) +  v D ( r 2 ) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D (r ( D 1 )) , and its  period 2 payoff is  v D (d( r 1 )) +  v D ( r 2 ) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D (r ( D 1 )) .
If party  D addresses issue  r 1 in period 1 , then its  period 1 payoff is  v D (D) + 
v D ( r 2 ) +  v D ( D 2 ) +  v D ( D 1 ) , and its  period 2 payoff is  v D (D) +  v D ( r 2 ) +  v D ( D 2 ) + 
v D (r) .
Hence, the difference between party  D ’s dynamic payoff if it addresses issue  D 1 
and if it addresses issue  r 1 in period 1 is
  v D ( r 1 ) +  v D (d( r 1 )) + 2 [ v D (r ( D 1 )) −  v D (D) −  v D ( D 1 )] +  v D ( D 1 ) −  v D (r). 
It follows that if  v D (r) −  v D ( D 1 ) >  v D ( r 1 ) +  v D (d( r 1 )) + 2 [ v D (r ( D 1 )) − 
v D (D) −  v D ( D 1 )] , which is still possible under strongly partisan preferences, 
party  D addresses issue  r 1 in period 1 in equilibrium. ∎
I. Proof of Proposition 7
We prove part (i) by considering the cases when  π 1 =  s D and when  π 1 =  W D . (a) Suppose  π 1 =  s D . Then party  D ’s  period 1 payoff is higher by addressing 
issue  D 1 instead of addressing issue  D 2 . If  π 2 =  s D , then, by the argument in 
Proposition 2, its  period 2 payoff is also higher if it addresses  D 1 than if it addresses 
D 2 in period  1 . If  π 2 =  s r , then, since preferences are partisan, party  r addresses 
issue  r 1 regardless of whether  D 1 or  D 2 was addressed in period  1 . In this case, 
party  D ’s  period 2 payoff is again higher if it addresses  D 1 than if it addresses  D 2 
in period  1 . Since party  D ’s dynamic payoff is higher by addressing issue  D 1 than 
issue  D 2 in period  1 when the incumbent in period  2 will be in strong power, con-
tinuity of the expected payoff in power transition probabilities implies that if it 
is sufficiently likely that the incumbent will be in strong power in period  2 , then 
party  D does not give priority to the less pressing Democratic issue  D 2 in period  1 . (b) Suppose  π 1 =  W D . Then, party  D ’s  period 1 payoff is again higher by address-
ing issue  D 1 instead of addressing issue  D 2 . As shown in part (a), if  π 2 =  s r , then 
party  D ’s  period 2 payoff is higher if it addresses  D 1 than if it addresses  D 2 in 
period  1 . So we only need to consider the case when  π 2 =  s D . If party  D addresses 
issue  D 2 in period  1 , then it will address issue  D 1 in period  2 when it comes in strong 
power. Hence, the total gain in its payoff is  2 [ v D (r ( D 2 )) −  v D ( D 2 )] +  v D (D) −  v D ( D 1 ) . If party  D addresses issue  D 1 in period  1 , then it will address either 
issue  D 2 or issue  r 1 in period  2 when it comes in to strong power. Hence, the total 
gain in its payoff is
  2 [ v D (r ( D 1 )) −  v D ( D 1 )] + max { v D (D) −  v D ( D 2 ),  v D (D) −  v D ( r 1 )}
   ≥ 2 [ v D (r( D 1 )) −  v D ( D 1 )] +  v D (D) −  v D ( D 2 ). 
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Since
   2 [ v D (r ( D 1 )) −  v D ( D 1 )] +  v D (D) −  v D ( D 2 ) 
      −  [2 [ v D (r ( D 2 )) −  v D ( D 2 )] +  v D (D) −  v D ( D 1 )] 
    = 2 [ v D (r ( D 1 )) −  v D (r ( D 2 ))] +  v D ( D 2 ) −  v D ( D 1 ) > 0, 
it follows that party  D ’s dynamic payoff is higher by addressing issue  D 1 than 
issue  D 2 in period  1 in this case too. Continuity implies that if it is sufficiently likely 
that the incumbent will be in strong power in period  2 , then party  D does not give 
priority to the less pressing Democratic issue  D 2 in period  1 .
We prove part (ii) also by considering the cases when  π 1 =  W D and when 
 π 1 =  s D . (a) Suppose  π 1 =  W D . As shown in Proposition 6, party  D may give 
priority to issue  D 2 when the incumbent in period  2 will be in weak power. By con-
tinuity, party  D may give priority to issue  D 2 when it is sufficiently likely that the 
incumbent in period  2 will be in weak power. (b) Suppose  π 1 =  s D . First, consider 
the case when  π 2 =  W r . Suppose (A3) holds, which implies that party  r addresses 
r 1 if  D 1 was addressed in period  1 and addresses  D 1 if  D 2 or  r 1 was addressed in 
period  1 . If party  D addresses issue  D 2 in period  1 , then its total gain in payoff is 
2 [ v D (D) −  v D ( D 2 )] +  v D (r) −  v D ( D 1 ) . If party  D addresses issue  D 1 in period  1 , 
then its total gain in payoff is  2 [ v D (D) −  v D ( D 1 )] +  v D (d( r 1 )) −  v D ( r 1 ) . If party 
D addresses issue  r 1 in period  1 , then party  r will address issue  D 1 in period  2 and 
party  D ’s total gain in payoff is  2 [ v D (D) −  v D ( r 1 )] +  v D (r) −  v D ( D 1 ). It follows 
that party  D prefers to address  D 2 instead of  D 1 or  r 1 in period  1 if
(A6)   v D (r) −  v D ( D 1 ) +  v D ( r 1 ) −  v D (d( r 1 )) + 2 [ v D ( D 1 ) −  v D ( D 2 )] > 0 
and  v D ( D 2 ) <  v D ( r 1 ) .
We next consider the case when  π 2 =  W D under the assumption that
(A7)  v D (r( D 2 )) −  v D ( D 2 ) >  v D (D) −  v D ( r 1 ). 
Then party  D addresses a Democratic issue in period  2 . If party  D addresses 
issue  D 1 in period  1 , then it will address issue  D 2 in period  2, and its total gain in 
payoff is  2 [ v D (D) −  v D ( D 1 )] +  v D (r ( D 2 )) −  v D ( D 2 ) . If party  D addresses issue  D 2 
in period  1 , then it will address issue  D 1 in period  2 , and its total gain in payoff is 
 2 [ v D (D) −  v D ( D 2 )] +  v D (r ( D 1 )) −  v D ( D 1 ) . If party  D addresses issue  r 1 in 
period  1 , then it will address issue  D 1 in period  2 , and its total gain in payoff is 
 2 [ v D (D) −  v D ( r 1 )] +  v D (r ( D 1 )) −  v D ( D 1 ) . Given (A7), party  D prefers to address 
issue  D 2 instead of issue  r 1 in period  1 . Also, if
(A8)  v D (r ( D 1 )) −  v D (r ( D 2 )) +  v D ( D 1 ) −  v D ( D 2 ) > 0,  
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then party  D prefers to address issue  D 2 instead of issue  D 1 in period  1 . To sum-
marize, if (A3), (A6), (A7), (A8), and  v D ( D 2 ) <  v D ( r 1 ) hold, then party  D gives 
priority to issue  D 2 if the incumbent is in weak power in period  2 . By continuity, 
the result holds if it is sufficiently likely that the incumbent is in weak power in 
period  2 . ∎
J. Proof of Proposition 8
If party  D addresses issue  D 1 in period  1 , then, since  π 1 =  W D , party  D moves 
the policy on issue  D 1 to  r ( D 1 ) . Suppose  v D ( r 1 ) >  v D ( D 2 ) , which implies that 
party  D addresses  D 2 in period  2 since  π 2 =  s D . In this case, party  D ’s total gain in 
payoff is  2 [ v D (r ( D 1 )) −  v D ( D 1 )] +  v D (D) −  v D ( D 2 ) .
If party  D addresses issue  r 1 in period  1 , then party  D moves the policy on 
issue  r 1 to  D . Since preferences are strongly partisan and  π 2 =  s D , party  D 
addresses issue  D 1 in period  2 . In this case, party  D ’s total gain in payoff is 
 2 [ v D (D) −  v D ( r 1 )] +  v D (D) −  v D ( D 1 ) .
If follows that if  v D ( r 1 ) >  v D ( D 2 ) and
(A9)   2 [( v D (D) −  v D ( r 1 )) − ( v D (r ( D 1 )) −  v D ( D 1 ))] >  v D ( D 1 ) −  v D ( D 2 ) ,
then party  D ’s payoff is higher by addressing issue  r 1 instead of addressing issue 
D 1 or  D 2 in period  1 . Under strongly partisan preferences,  ( v D (D) −  v D ( r 1 )) − ( v D (r ( D 1 )) −  v D ( D 1 )) < 0 , but since  v D ( D 1 ) −  v D ( D 2 ) < 0 , condition (A9) can 
still be satisfied. It is also straightforward to show that party  D does not give priority 
to issue  D 2 . Hence, party  D may address issue  r 1 in period  1 in equilibrium even 
under strongly partisan preferences.  ∎
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